



ALEXANDER DUGIN



**EURASIAN
MISSION**

AN INTRODUCTION TO NEO-EURASIANISM

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Editor's Note

The following texts were selected by me in collaboration with Prof. Dugin from many different sources as giving an overview of the ideology of neo-Eurasianism as propagated by the International Eurasian Movement (IEM) in Russia today. Chapters 1 through 8 were originally published as a booklet in Russia in 2005. Chapters 9 and 11 were written in 2011, chapters 10 and 12 in 2012, and chapters 13 and 14 in 2014. Chapter 15 was published as a booklet by the IEM in Russia in 2012. Chapter 16 was compiled by me from various informal statements that Prof. Dugin made on his Facebook wall in 2012 and 2013. Chapter 17 is the transcript of an interview with Prof. Dugin that was conducted in February 2012, shortly before the re-election of Vladimir Putin. The Introduction is original to this volume.

Some of these texts were originally written in English, and some were translated anonymously by volunteers from the International Eurasian Movement — all were re-edited by me. To these volunteers I give my thanks.

Those who are interested in learning more about neo-Eurasianism can visit the official Fourth Political Theory Website at www.4pt.su.

JOHN B. MORGAN
November 24, 2014

Introduction

Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory

Eurasianism as structuralism

First of all, Eurasianism is a philosophy, and as all true philosophy it implicitly contains a political perspective, an approach to history and the possibility of being transformed into an ideology. Eurasianism as a philosophy is based on structural analysis and it is not a coincidence that the founder of Eurasianism, Count Nikolai Trubetzkoy, was a leading figure in structuralist linguistics. Eurasianism is a type of structuralism with the accent placed on the multiplicity and synchronicity of structures. The structure is viewed as a whole that is something much more than the sum of its parts. This is the rule of Eurasianism. It is holism dealing with organic, structural entities.

The primary concern of Eurasianist philosophy is civilization. There are different civilizations, not only one. Each of them has its own structure that defines the elements of which it consists, and which gives them meaning and coherence. We cannot apply the rules and structure we find in one such structure to those we find in other civilization — not in a diachronic or a synchronic way. Each civilizational structure possesses its own sense of time (*la durée*) and its own space. They are thus incomparable with one another. Every human society belongs to a particular civilization and should be studied only in accordance with its own criteria. This brings us to the starting point of modern anthropology, which began with Franz Boaz and Marcel Mauss, which insists on the plurality of human societies in the absence of any universal pattern. It is therefore no mere coincidence that Claude Lévi-Strauss, the well-known father of structural anthropology, studied under Roman Jakobson in the United States. Jakobson had been a colleague and friend of Trubetzkoy.

The plurality of human societies, each one of which represents a specific kind of semantic structure that is entirely unique and incomparable with any other, is the basis of Eurasian philosophy in general.

Eurasianism as hermeneutical tool

This principle was applied by the Eurasianists to various fields, including Russian history, geopolitics, sociology, international relations, cultural studies, political science, and so on. In any field the uniqueness of Russian civilization in comparison with all others, Western and well as Eastern, was affirmed and defended. Thus, Eurasianists view Western, European civilization as one concrete structure with its own understanding of time, space, history, human nature, values and goals. But there are other civilizations, namely Asian, African, Latin American and Russian. Russian civilization possesses some of the same features as Europe and some of the features of Asian culture

(above all of the Turanian type), representing an organic synthesis of the two, and cannot therefore be reduced to the mere sum of its Western and Eastern elements. Rather it has an original identity.

The structural method caused the Eurasianists to begin to study this Russian civilization as an organic whole with its own semantics, which revealed the nature of its identity in its implicit way of understanding history, religion, normative politics, culture, strategy, and so on. But in order to conduct such a study in a truly structural way they were obliged to radically reject Western pretensions to universality, thus deconstructing Western universalism, ethnocentrism and its implicit cultural imperialism. Since the nature of Russian civilization is not Western, it should be defined beyond the “self-evident” principles taken for granted in European modernity, such as progress, linear time, homogeneous space, materialistic physics, capitalism as the universal destiny of social development, and so on. The term Eurasia, which could also be expressed as Russia-Eurasia, was introduced in order to define a clear line of demarcation between the two civilizations: the European, which was judged to be essentially a purely local phenomenon historically and geographically, and the Eurasian one. From this starting point, two schools emerged: the radical critics of Western universalism and eurocentrism (their position being formulated in Trubetzkoy’s book *Europe and Mankind*, in which Europe is portrayed as being opposed to humanity as a whole in a way that is similar to Toynbee’s duality of “the West and the rest”), and those who dealt with the independent Russian-Eurasian structure taken as a key for deciphering Russian history and as a means of creating a normative project for the Eurasian future — a Eurasian project.

The interpretations and projects of the Eurasianists

The Eurasian project was developed in the form of a political philosophy on the basis of the multipolarity of civilizations, anti-imperialism, anti-modernism and on the structure of Russia itself. This last was defined in terms of the principles of the Slavophiles, along with the important addition of a positive evaluation of the cultural elements which had been borrowed by the Russians from Asiatic societies beginning with the period of the Mongols. Indeed, one of the most important books of the Eurasianist movement, also written by Trubetzkoy, was called *The Legacy of Genghis Khan*. Therefore for the Eurasianists the West was in the wrong — a purely regional phenomenon pretending to universal status via imperialism; thus it follows that modernity, which was also a Western phenomenon, is also entirely a product of this locale and is inherently imperialistic. Russian history was considered as the struggle of Eurasian civilization against the West, and in the last centuries also as the struggle against modernity. Russia’s Eurasian future should be built in a form that corresponds to the specificity of Russia’s structure and in accordance with its values and basic beliefs. The Eurasianists proposed to take and affirm these qualities as its norms. They said “no” to progress. They saw social development as a cycle, not in terms of capitalist notions of development. They called for an organic, agricultural economy, not materialism, and for ideacracy (the power of ideas). They also said “no” to democracy, favoring popular monarchy. They rejected the notion of purely

individualistic, superficial liberty, and advocated for social responsibility and spiritual, inner freedom.

The Eurasianists identified Russian-Eurasian structures within Bolshevism, but only in a very perverted and Westernized form (Marxism). They viewed the October Revolution of 1917 as more of an eschatological, messianic revolt than as a transition from a capitalist phase to a socialist one. The Eurasianists foresaw the inner transmutation of Bolshevism, which would bring about its metamorphosis into a Leftist Eurasianism and bring about a future return to the Christian Faith, to monarchy and to a pre-modern type of agricultural economy.

Their short-term expectations for the evolution of Eurasianism proved to be incorrect but were later realized in the 1980s, long after the extinction of the Eurasianist movement that had existed as a part of the White émigré movement following the October Revolution. Looking back from a time when most of their analyses have been confirmed, we have adopted their heritage as our own and thus commenced the second wave of Eurasianism: neo-Eurasianism.

Neo-Eurasianism: new features

Neo-Eurasianism, as well as early Eurasianism, was conceived by us from the outset as a Russian form of Third Way ideology belonging to the same philosophical family as the German Conservative Revolution. We therefore accepted it as a particularly Russian paradigm of a broad anti-modern philosophical and political tendency, akin to traditionalism or the Third Position. Left Eurasianism was represented by National Bolshevism.

An important confirmation of the relevance of Eurasianism to politics can be found in the way in which geopolitical thinking is conceived in dualistic terms, such as thalassocracy vs. tellurocracy or Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism. This coincides perfectly with the primary way that the first Eurasianists framed things in their *Weltanschauung*. Likewise, the Eurasianist Nikolai Alexeyev was the first scholar in Russia to cite René Guénon. Also, Eurasian criticism of modernity and eurocentrism was very close to the spirit of the European New Right as represented by Alain de Benoist. Neo-Eurasianism was thus enriched by new themes: traditionalism, geopolitics, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, the Conservative Revolution, structuralism, anthropology, and so on.

In the early 1990s neo-Eurasianism was an integral part of the larger patriotic and anti-liberal movement (those in the opposition who represented a synthesis of the Left and the Right). After that, the Eurasianists became the core of the National Bolshevik movement. It wasn't until the late 1990s that an independent neo-Eurasianist movement, with its own political program, was formed. It based itself not only on older sources but also on new elements taken from Western anti-modern sources, including some from the school of postmodernism. In early 2000 it gained some level of social recognition and received its first positive responses from within the political circles around Vladimir Putin.

The Fourth Political Theory

The last important ideological shift in the philosophy of neo-Eurasianism occurred in 2007–2008, when the basic principles of the Fourth Political Theory were laid down. That was the moment of the resolute and irreversible step from Eurasianism as a Russian version of the Third Position to the Fourth Position. This was a continuation of Eurasianist ideas — still consisting of anti-liberalism, anti-modernism, anti-eurocentrism, the structuralist approach, and multipolarity — but instead of it being a creative synthesis of the anti-liberal (socialist) Right with the identitarian (non-dogmatic, or Sorelian for example) Left, it began to move in a direction taking it beyond all the varieties of political modernity. This included transcending the Third Position, or rather the mixture of the far Left with far Right (National Bolshevism). The idea behind this was to create the normative for the future, completely removed from any modern political tendency — beyond liberalism, Communism and fascism.

The Fourth Political Theory has begun, little by little, to take shape by overcoming the logic and principles of the Third Way, instead inviting those who consider it to freely affirm unmodern and non-Western structures as a valid foundation for a normative and sovereign civilization. The philosophical basis for the total destruction of modernity was laid by Heideggerian philosophy, which annihilates all of the modern philosophical concepts: subject, object, reality, time, space, technics, the individual, and so on. Some people, as for example the Brazilian philosopher Flavia Virginia, refer to this as “*Dasein* politics.”

In the field of international relations, the theory of the multipolar world was recently elaborated by Eurasianists. Besides these geopolitical works, studies have been conducted in many other fields, such as ethnosociology, the sociology of imagination, noology, neo-traditionalism (based on the theme of the Radical Subject), an approach to an original Russian phenomenological philosophy, archeomodern studies, and so on. The amount and quality of such works created within the framework of the Fourth Political Theory have been sufficient to carve out a niche for it that is independent from both Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism, but which continues in the same profound lines of forces. We could therefore consider the Fourth Political Theory as developing out of and as a continuation of Eurasianism in which Eurasianism represents its basic paradigm and starting point. It is theoretically possible to study the Fourth Political Theory without any knowledge of Eurasianism, but in order to understand its principles more deeply, familiarity with Eurasianism is desirable.

Looking at how things have developed, we can now recognize that Eurasianism is a kind of preparation for the Fourth Political Theory: the first stage leading to it. But at the same time, Eurasianism represents a coherent and self-sufficient philosophy and *Weltanschauung* based on this philosophy, and is thus a subject worth studying in its own right, apart from the more complicated and detailed domain of the Fourth Political Theory.

An introduction to Eurasianism

In this book we have gathered together various texts related to both Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism. We hope they can serve as an introduction to more detailed studies. Until recently not much of this work was available in the English language, although Arktos has now published my books *The Fourth Political Theory* in 2012 and *Putin vs Putin* in 2014, and Washington Summit Publishers has issued *Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning* in 2014. Arktos plans many more translations of my works in the near future.

Eurasianism can be applied to the field of geopolitics, where it represents the definitive summation of the perspective of the civilizations of the Land, as opposed to that of the civilizations of the Sea, the latter of which is the point of view of the Atlanticist politics of the United States at present and of its geopolitical strategic thinkers, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski. Several books detailing Eurasianist geopolitics have already been published, from my book *The Foundations of Geopolitics*, first issued in 1997, up to my recent and very detailed books *Geopolitika* (2012) and *The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (2013). Translations of some of these books are being prepared by Arktos. I also published a manual of international relations in 2013. Geopolitical and strategic studies of this sort are now abundant in Russia and elsewhere.

Eurasianism has a secure place in the field of Russian history, developing along the line of George Vernadsky, the prominent Russian Eurasian historicist, and Lev Gumilev, the famous Russian Eurasianist ethnologist. Eurasianism can be very useful for making accurate political analyses of the political situation in Russia, particularly for understanding the Putin phenomenon and his drive to create a Eurasian Union in the post-Soviet space.

In the broader sense, Eurasianism can be considered as a form of continentalism for the project of the creation of a European-Russian common space — the Greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as declared by Vladimir Putin (who adopted the concept that had first been propagated by Jean Thiriart). Beyond this more localized project, Eurasianism advocates for multipolarity, representing an alternative to unipolar globalization and the neo-colonial Westernization that has adopted such forms as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) accords.

Eurasianism can be very useful for those who are searching to understand the nature of the world we are living in — its challenges, its limits, and its paradigms, as well as its open and hidden agendas, its choices, and its alternatives. Above all it is an absolute necessity for anyone who wants to understand the true nature of Russia — its profound identity and its structures — past, present, or future.

EURASIANISM

Milestones of Eurasianism

A Historical and Conceptual Introduction to Eurasianism

Eurasianism^[1] is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, unified by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, and presenting — among the various cultures of the world — an original combination of Western and Eastern features; as a consequence, Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced either to the former nor to the latter.

The founders of Eurasianism were:

- Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy (1890–1938), philologist and linguist.
- Pyotr N. Savitsky (1895–1965), geographer and economist.
- Georges V. Florovsky (1893–1979), historian of culture, theologian and patriot.
- George V. Vernadsky (1887–1973), historian and geopolitician.
- Nikolai N. Alexeyev (1879–1964), jurist and politologist.
- V. N. Ilin, historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian.

Eurasianism's main value consisted of ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasianism viewed Russian culture not as simply a component of European civilization, but also as an original civilization, encompassing the experience not only of the West but also — to the same extent — of the East. The Russian people, from this perspective, must not be placed either among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a completely unique Eurasian community. Such originality in Russian culture and statehood (displaying European as well as Asian features) also defines the distinct historical path of Russia and of her national and state program, which does not coincide with that of the Western-European tradition.

Foundations

Civilization concept

The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values and promoted it to the rank of a universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative phenomenon. Every people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West in order to safeguard its own path, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries of the Earth in order to defend their freedom as civilizations.

Criticism of the Roman-German civilization

Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularization of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to the fore such values as individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, and economic exploitation. The Roman-German civilization bases its right to global universality not upon spiritual greatness, but upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of other peoples are evaluated by it only in terms of the Western notion of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress.

The factor of space

There is no universal pattern of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logic. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples' culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic, and political forms. The "place" where any people or state "development" happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this "development" — up to the point when the two elements become one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis ("before," "after," "developed" or "non-developed," and so on) but also along the spatial axis ("east," "west," "steppe," "mountains," and so on).

No single state or region has the right to claim to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own ages, and its own "rationality," and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria.

The climate of Europe and the influence of its landscapes generated the particularity of European civilization, where the influences of the woods in northern Europe and of the coast in the Mediterranean prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the lower lands the Chinese one, the mountainous islands the Japanese one, and the union of the steppe and the woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of a landscape lives in the entire history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated from them or suppressed.

State and nation

The first Russian Slavophiles in the nineteenth century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of Russian (Slavic and Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West) on the other. The Slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of ancient times, their love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about Russia's separation from many aspects of the Western

pattern.

From this school the Eurasianists inherited the positions of the most recent Slavophiles and further developed their theses through a positive evaluation of Eastern influences.

The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of Russian statehood. In it, the national idea achieved a new status; after Moscow's refusal to recognize the Florentine union of the Eastern and Western churches, which led to the arrest and proscription of the Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev who supported it, and the rapid decay of Byzantium, the Tsargrad Rus' inherited the mantle of the Orthodox empire.

Political platform

Wealth and prosperity, a strong state, an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a "leading idea." A political regime which supposes the establishment of a "leading idea" as a supreme value was called an "ideocracy" by the Eurasianists, from the Greek *idea* and *kratos*, or power. Russia was always thought of by them as the Sacred Rus', as a power (*derzhava*) fulfilling its distinct historical mission. The Eurasianist worldview must also be the national idea of the coming Russia: its "leading idea."

The Eurasianist choice

Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a "steppe and woods" empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, self-restraint, mutual aid, asceticism, willpower, and tenacity. Only such qualities can empower one to keep the wide and scarcely-populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone under control. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue, and rigid hierarchy.

Western democracy evolved under the particular conditions of ancient Athens and was shaped in the course of the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of "local European development." Such democracy does not represent a universal standard. Imitating the forms of European "liberal democracy" is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people in political rule must be defined by a different term: *demotia*, from the Greek *demos*, or people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. *Demotia* supposes a system of land councils, district governments or national governments (in the case of smaller populations). It is developed on the basis of social self-government and on the "peasant" world. An example of *demotia* was the fact of the Church hierarchies being elected by the parishioners in Muscovite Rus'.

The Work of Lev Gumilev as a development of Eurasianist thinking

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev (1912–1992), the son of the Russian poet Nikolai Gumilev and of the poetess Anna Akhmatova, was an ethnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the Kalmyk Eurasianist, *Genghis Khan as an Army Leader* by E. Khara-Vadan, and by the works of Pyotr Savitsky. In its own works, Gumilev developed the fundamental Eurasianist theses. Towards the end of his life he called himself “the last of the Eurasianists.”

Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory

Gumilev’s theory was passionarity (*passionarnost*) as a development of Eurasianist idealism, the essence of which lies in the fact that every *ethnos*, as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of cosmic energies that cause the “passionarity effect,” which is an active and intense way of living. In such conditions the *ethnos* undergoes a “genetic mutation,” which leads to the birth of the “passionaries” — individuals of a special temper and talent. These become the creators of new ethnoses, cultures, and states. He drew scientific attention to the proto-history of the ancient, autochthonic peoples of the East and their colossal ethnic and cultural heritage. This was entirely absorbed by the great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (the Huns, Turks, Mongols, and so on). He also developed a Turkophile attitude in the theory of “ethnic complementarity.”

An *ethnos* is generally any set of individuals or any “collective”: a people, population, nation, tribe, or family clan, based on a common historical destiny. “Our Great-Russian ancestors,” wrote Gumilev, “rather quickly and easily mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buryats, who assimilated the Russian culture, during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The same Great-Russians mixed easily with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with the Kazakhs and Kalmyks. Through intermarriage they peacefully coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks, between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, were fused with the Russians in Central Russia.” Therefore the history of Muscovite Rus’ cannot be understood outside the framework of the ethnic contacts that took place between the Russians and the Tatars, nor without that of the history of the Eurasian continent.

The advent of neo-Eurasianism: historical and social context

The crisis of the Soviet paradigm

In the mid-1980s, Soviet society began to lose its cohesiveness and its ability to understand both itself and the outside world. Cracks began to appear in the Soviet models of self-understanding. Society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, but this was a confused feeling, since no one could predict from which direction the change would come. At that time a rather unconvincing divide began to appear between the “forces of progress” and the “forces of reaction”; the “reformers” and the “conservators of the past”; the “partisans of reform” and the “enemies of reform.”

Infatuation with the Western models

In that situation the term “reform” itself became a synonym for “liberal democracy.” A hasty conclusion was inferred from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system which purported the superiority of the Western model and the necessity to copy it. On the theoretical level this was hardly self-evident, since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diverse array of choices than the primitive dualism represented by the conflict of socialism versus capitalism, or of the Warsaw Pact versus NATO. Yet it was precisely this primitive logic that prevailed: the “partisans of reform” became unconditional apologists for the West, whose structure and logic they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reform” proved to be the inertia-bound preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logic became more and more obsolete. In such a condition of imbalance, the reformers/pro-Westerners had on their side a potential for energy, novelty, expectations of change, a creative drive, and new perspectives, while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertia, immobility, and appeals to the customary and familiar. It was in this psychological and aesthetic setting that liberal-democratic policy prevailed in Russia during the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.

The collapse of state unity

The result of these “reforms” was the collapse of the unity of the Soviet state and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union. The destruction of the Soviet system and its rationale was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationale developed in conformity with national and historical conditions. A peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history began to prevail: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the Western point of view, and to be evaluated as something estranged, transient, and alien (the “reformers” typically referred to Russia as “this country”). That was not the Russian view of the West so much as the Western view of Russia. It was no wonder that under such conditions the adoption of Western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of national state unity, but in order to destroy what remained of it. The destruction of the state was not a chance outcome of the “reforms”; it was in fact among their strategic aims.

The birth of an anti-Western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment

In the course of the “reforms” and their deepening, the inadequacy of merely reacting to the situation began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989–90) the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition” began in which there was a confluence between a segment of the “Soviet conservatives” (those who were capable of a minimal level of reflection) and groups of “reformers” who were disappointed with the reforms or who had “become conscious of their anti-state direction,” as well as with groups of representatives from the patriotic movements, which had already formed during *perestroika* and had tried to shape the sentiment of “state power” (*derzhava*) within a non-Communist

(Orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. After a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of strategic, intellectual, and material support from outside, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.

Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually becoming one of the main currents within the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness.

Stages in the early development of neo-Eurasianist ideology

First stage (1985–90)

- Alexander Dugin gives seminars and lectures to various groups within the newborn conservative-patriotic movement. He offers criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and national qualitative element.
- In 1989 the first publications appear in the review *Sovetskaya literatura* (Soviet Literature). Dugin's books are published in Italy (*Continente Russia* [Continent Russia], 1989) and in Spain (*Rusia Misterio de Eurasia* [Russia, Mystery of Eurasia], 1990).
- In 1990 René Guénon's *The Crisis of the Modern World* is published in Russia with commentary by Dugin, as well as Dugin's *Puti Absoljuta* (The Paths of the Absolute), offering an exposition of the foundations of traditionalist philosophy.
- During these years Eurasianism displays “Right-wing conservative” features which are close to historical traditionalism, containing Orthodox-monarchic and “ethnic-pochevennik” (i.e., linked to ideas of soil and land) elements which are sharply critical of “Left-wing” ideologies.

Second stage (1991–93)

- A revision of the anti-Communism that was typical of the first stage of neo-Eurasianism begins. The Soviet period is reevaluated in the spirit of “National Bolshevism” and “Left-wing Eurasianism.”
- The primary representatives of the “New Right” in Europe visit Moscow (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio Mutti, and others).
- Eurasianism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals in Russia.
- On the basis of an affinity of terminology, Andrei Sakharov begins speaking about Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic, instead of a political and geopolitical, sense (and without ever making use of Eurasianism in itself, as he was previously a convinced Atlanticist); a group of “democrats” tries to start a project of “democratic Eurasianism” (Gavriil Popov, Sergei Stankevic, and Lev Ponomaryov).
- Oleg Lobov, Oleg Soskovets, and Sergei Baburin also speak about their own forms of

Eurasianism.

- In 1992–93 the first issue of *Elements: The Eurasianist Review* is published. Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of Eurasianism are given in high schools and universities. Many translations, articles, and seminars appear.

Third stage (1994–98): theoretical development of neo-Eurasianist orthodoxy

- The publication of Dugin's primary works *Misterii Evrazii* (Mysteries of Eurasia, 1996), *Konspirologija* (Conspirology, 1994), *Osnovy Geopolitiki* (Foundations of Geopolitics, 1996), *Konservativnaja revoljutsija* (The Conservative Revolution, 1994), and *Tamplieri proletariata* (Knight Templars of the Proletariat, 1997). The works of Trubetzkoy, Vernadsky, Alexeyev and Savitsky are issued by Agraf Editions during the period from 1995 until 1998.
- The Arctogaia Website is launched in 1996.
- Direct and indirect references to Eurasianism appear in the programs of the KPFR (Communist Party), LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party), and NDR (New Democratic Russia) — that is, on the Left, Right, and centre. A growing number of publications on Eurasianist themes appear, and many Eurasianist digests are issued.
- There begins to be criticism of Eurasianism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists and orthodox Communists, as well as from the liberals.
- An academic, “weak” version of Eurasianism appears (from Profs. Alexander S. Panarin, Vitaly Y. Pashchenko, Fyodor Girenok and others) combined with elements of the Illuminist paradigm, which is rejected by Eurasianist orthodoxy. The latter then evolves towards more radically anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-globalist positions.
- Eurasianism attracts more and more followers in Kazakhstan. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is himself an adherent of Eurasianist ideology. In this context, the opening of the Lev Gumilev University at Astana should be viewed as an event of crucial significance. In April 1994, Nazarbayev announces the idea of the “Eurasian Union.” For the first time in the history of Eurasianism, a high-ranking politician voices support for its vision and offers concrete measures for its practical implementation. The groundbreaking nature of this event is analyzed and put into perspective in Dr. Dugin's essay, *The Eurasian Mission of Nursultan Nazarbayev* (2004).

Fourth stage (1998–2001)

- The gradual de-identification of neo-Eurasianism from its collateral political-cultural and party manifestations takes place; it instead turns in an autonomous direction (Arctogaia, New University, *Vtorzhenie* [Invasion]) outside the opposition and the extreme Left- and Right-wing movements.
- Apology of *staroobryadchestvo* (Old Rite Orthodoxy).

- A shift to centrist political positions and support for Primakov as the new President. Dugin becomes an advisor to the Speaker of the Duma, Gennadiy N. Seleznyov.
- The publication of the Eurasianist booklet *Nash put'* (Our Path, 1998).
- The publication of *Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie* (Eurasianist Invasion) as a supplement to *Zavtra*. There is a growing distance from the opposition and a shift closer to the government's positions.
- Theoretical researches and expositions take place. *The Russian Thing* (*Russkaja vesch'*, 2001) is published. Further publications appear in the *Nezavisimaja Gazeta* and *Moskovskij Novosti*, and the radio program *Finis Mundi* is broadcast on Radio 101. Additional radio broadcasts on geopolitical subjects and neo-Eurasianism occur on Radio *Svobodnaja Rossija* between 1998 and 2000.

Fifth stage (2001–2002)

- The foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement Eurasia on “radical center” positions; declaration of full support to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin on April 21, 2001.
- The Chief Mufti of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate, Sheik Talgat Tadzhuiddin, declares his support for the Eurasian Movement.
- The periodical *Evraziizkoe obozrenie* (Eurasianist Review) begins publication.
- Jewish neo-Eurasianism begins to appear (Avigdor Eskin, Avraam Shmulevich, and Vladimir Bukarsky).
- The creation of the Website for the Eurasian Movement (www.eurasia.com.ru).
- The conference, “Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?” is held with the participation of Khozh-Ahmed Noukhayev, the Chechen theorist of “Islamic Eurasianism” (“Vedeno or Washington?”, Moscow, 2001).
- The publication of books by Erenzhen Khara-Davan and Yakov Bromberg (2002).

Sixth stage (2002–2003): establishment of the Eurasia political party

- On May 30, 2002 at Saint Daniel's monastery in Moscow, a constituent (foundational) congress of the political party “Eurasia” is convened. Its program and charter is adopted and the party leader, Alexander Dugin, as well as the members of its political council, are elected.
- The Eurasia political party disseminates Eurasianist ideas and publishes a series of monographs on the Eurasian agenda by Alexander Dugin: *The Program of the Political Party 'Eurasia'*, *Foundations of Eurasianism*, etc. An informational and analytical gateway on the Web is created: evrazia.info.
- Alexander Dugin publishes a number of articles on the Eurasian agenda in major Russian periodicals. Eurasianist writings begin appearing regularly in such major newspapers as *Rosssiyskaya Gazeta*, *Komsomolskaya Gazeta*, and *Trud*. Dugin participates in television